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II] THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-v-
GASPER BORGOGNO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
rise N 970232-CA 
Priority No. 2_ 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF
 P R 0 C E E D I N G S 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-
3(2) (f) (1992 as amended), whereby a defendant in i district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final order for anything other than a first-degree or 
capital felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the nature of the prosecutor's discovery 
response constituted a violation of the defendant/appellant's 
due-process rights, where the prosecution made a Response to 
Motion for Discovery (no motion for discovery having been made, a 
response having been submitted pursuant to an "open-file" 
policy), containing blanket language concerning the potential 
availability of either aural or visual evidence, together with 
the submission to defense counsel of a police report referencing 
the manufacturing of an audio tape from the confidential 
informant's wire and the tape having been submitted for 
transcription, as the defendant/appellant's due-process rights 
have been established under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and whether such violation constitutes reversible 
error pursuant to the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7, and § 
77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Claims regarding 
prosecutory failure to produce exculpatory and/or inculpatory 
evidence are examined under a standard of law as set forth under 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, together with the 
facts of the case, and whether the error is harmful {State v. 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1993)) or whether absent the 
error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more 
favorable to the defendant {State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
2. Whether defense counsel's failure to make a formal 
discovery request in order to acquire the tape recording (and/or 
a transcript thereof) made pursuant to the wiring of the 
confidential informant, and to follow up with a motion to compel 
the production of the recording and transcript, constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, § 7. Claims of ineffectiveness of 
counsel are reviewed under a standard of a reasonable probability 
that except for ineffective counsel, the result of the trial 
court would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh'g 
denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2s 864 (1984); 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-119 (Utah 1989). 
3. Whether defense counsel's failure to listen to the 
tape recording or acquire a transcript of the tape recording 
and/or a copy of the tape recording itself, made pursuant to the 
wiring of the confidential informant, constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
§ 7. Claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are reviewed under a 
standard of a reasonable probability that except for ineffective 
counsel, the result of the trial court would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 
3562, 82 L.Ed.2s 864 (1984); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-
119 (Utah 1989) . 
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4. Whether defense counsel's failure to request voir 
dire regarding extensive pretrial publicity concerning a 
methamphetamine laboratory found in Stockton, Utah, which caused 
the evacuation of the town, and to which defendant was linked, 
impeded defendant's right to an impartial jury and constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, §§7 and 10. Claims of ineffectiveness 
of counsel are reviewed under a standard of a reasonable 
probability that except for ineffective counsel, the result of 
the trial court would have been different. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2s 864 
(1984); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-119 (Utah 1989). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
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favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
Amendment XIV 
1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, § 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall 
consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony 
cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight 
persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall 
establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no 
event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. 
In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In 
civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a 
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with arranging for distribution 
of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of 
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) . 
(R. 4-5). 
At the arraignment August 26, 1996, defendant pled not 
guilty to the charge. In a jury trial held on January 21 and 24, 
1997, the defendant was found guilty as charged. (R. 17-18) . 
Defendant was sentenced on March 10, 1997, and was committed to 
the Tooele County Detention Center (R. 52-53) . 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 9, 1997 (R. 59), 
which has brought this matter before this Court. An order was 
entered on September 23, 1997, appointing new counsel to 
represent the defendant in the appellate process. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant/appellant is a 54-year-old male who, on 
or about August 13, 1996, was charged in District Court with one 
count of arranging for distribution of a controlled substance (a 
third-degree felony). The charge arose after a confidential 
informant, Joseph Grimaud (hereinafter "Grimaud"), acting upon 
the suggestion of his attorney, contacted the Tooele City Police 
6 
Department with an offer to "help out" with the Department's drug 
investigations in return for recommendations for reduced time in 
his sentencing. Grimaud was wired by the police officers and led 
them to the automotive shop owned by the Defendant, where Grimaud 
asked the defendant if he had "a teener." Defense and 
prosecution witnesses differ as to the exact words that were 
spoken thereafter, but Grimaud received methamphetamine from a 
third person present in the shop, with the consequence that the 
defendant was charged with arranging for distribution of a 
controlled substance. 
Defendant's trial counsel, Scott A. Broadhead, 
evidently did not make a formal request for discovery, as none 
appears in the court record; however, the prosecutor filed a 
Response to Motion for Discovery, on September 3, 1996 (Index of 
Record on Appeal). The police record (dated May 29, 1996) 
provided by the prosecution to the defense indicated that the 
tape recording produced by the wiring of the confidential 
informant, Grimaud, had been turned in for transcribing. The 
prosecution did not provide a copy of the tape transcription, nor 
of the tape itself, to the defense in its response to motion for 
discovery. (R. 8). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, the prosecution had an absolute duty to provide 
all evidence which was or might be exculpatory to the defendant, 
whether or not a discovery request was made by the defendant. 
The prosecution had a correlating duty (under Rule 16(a) (5) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) to provide all inculpatory 
evidence to the defense, when voluntary disclosure of evidence 
has been made. The prosecution had a police officer and the 
confidential informant who testified as to the defendant's words 
at the time of the drug buy by the confidential informant, 
Grimaud; these witnesses differed in their versions of the 
events. The defense also had one witness who testified about 
selling the illegal substance to the confidential informant; his 
version was closer to the police officer's and differed 
substantially from that of Grimaud. The tape of the night's 
proceedings would provide uncontrovertible evidence as to the 
words spoken, and whether a drawer was opened (as claimed by the 
confidential informant) to retrieve baggies for dividing a 
portion of the drug for Grimaud. Since it was not used by the 
prosecution at the trial of the matter, the inference by a 
reasonable onlooker is that the tape did not verify the story 
presented by the prosecution's witness, and was exculpatory. The 
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police report detailed the wiring of the confidential informant, 
the taping of the transmission from the wire, and the turning in 
of the tape for transcription. It was plain error for the 
prosecution to withhold the tape and the transcription from the 
defense. 
Secondly, defendant was entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel at his trial. Counsel had an obligation to 
obtain all the evidence available to him, particularly that which 
might benefit his client. Counsel had only to read the police 
record to be made aware of the existence of the tape. A casual 
perusal of the prosecution's Response to Motion for Discovery 
reveals that neither the tape nor a transcription thereof was 
specifically mentioned. A caveat pertaining to untranscribed 
tapes was clearly set forth in the Response. Counsel had an 
obligation to make a formal request for production of all 
inculpatory and exculpatory materials, and to investigate all 
available evidence as to its inculpatory or exculpatory value. 
Counsel had an obligation to make an appointment to listen to the 
tape, or to make a motion to compel the production of the tape 
and/or the transcript. Failure to fulfill either of these 
obligations constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, 
particularly since the probability is more than reasonable that 
9 
the outcome of the trial would have been different had the 
defendant's version of events been verified by the contents of 
the tape. 
Thirdly, defendant should have been given the 
opportunity to examine the veniremen concerning their exposure to 
the pre-trial publicity concerning the alleged existence of a 
"drug lab" in a building owned by him and an explosion and fire 
associated with the drug lab, with which he was linked by the 
police investigators, and which received extensive press coverage 
in the Tooele County newspapers. The failure of defense counsel 
to request voir dire on this subject, and to formally object to 
the lack of its inclusion in the actual voir dire used by the 
court, comprised ineffective assistance of counsel. Reasonable 
probability exists that the makeup of the empaneled jury would 
have been different had such questions been asked, so that the 
outcome of the trial was affected. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE NATURE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCOVERY RESPONSE DID 
NOT FURNISH EVIDENCE TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS 
ENTITLED, AND VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S DUE-PROCESS RIGHTS, 
SO THAT THE VERDICT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
The defense in this matter made no formal motion for 
discovery1; nevertheless, the prosecutor offered a response to 
motion for discovery under his "open-file" policy, which 
contained the following statements: 
1. The attached documents represent all discoverable, 
non-privileged, reports and witness statements, if any, in 
the possession of the County Attorney as of the date of the 
date (sic) of this response. Other documents, notes, 
statements, and related materials may exist in individual 
police agency files. You are directed to contact these 
agencies for such information. The prosecution does 
specifically deny any request for police officer notebook 
entries, officers' field notes, or documents of any and 
every kind and description in possession of or known to any 
police investigative agency, prosecuting agency, or 
department. 
3. Unless exculpatory evidence or evidence which 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt 
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment(,) is set forth in the attached 
documents, the same is unknown to the prosecutor, and the 
prosecutor herewith denies the request for production of the 
same. 
Appellate counsel has confirmed with Alan K. Jeppesen, 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney, that trial counsel made no formal 
request for discovery; however, Mr. Jeppesen produced a formal 
"Response to Motion for Discovery." 
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5. Recorded reports or evidence in aural or visual 
form, which has not been transcribed at the time of this 
response [,] may be viewed at the office of the prosecutor or 
such other place as he may designate upon an appointment 
being arranged between the prosecutor and the defendant's 
counsel. 
(R. 6-7). 
The response also contained the police report of Officer Roger 
Niesporek, wherein the officer described how a confidential 
informant was "wired" and the sounds picked up by the wire were 
transmitted to a receiver in the officer's vehicle, where they 
were recorded.2 The prosecutor's response did not specify the 
audiotape with specificity as not being produced. Simply saying 
to the defense, "Come look at it," wasn't good enough. Saying, 
"I'm not going to get it for you," isn't an adequate response 
under the standards established by the case law of our 
jurisdiction. The nature of the prosecutor's response was 
insufficient. 
2Appellate counsel has made inquiry into the location and 
contents of the audiotape, in an attempt to become familiar with 
the nature of its contents. The evidence custodian for Tooele 
County does not now know where the audiotape is. No transcript 
of the tape ever came into the possession of the Tooele County 
Attorney's office, according to Deputy County Attorney Alan K. 
Jeppesen. 
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A. The prosecution had an absolute responsibility to 
produce the tape recording to the defense. 
The appellate courts of the State of Utah have, in 
criminal prosecutions, established two independent obligations 
for the provision of evidence to a defendant: 
(1) The due-process duty to provide, without request by 
the defendant, all exculpatory evidence (This was declared in the 
case of State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988), wherein 
the Utah Supreme Court set forth the requirement that the State 
must disclose even unrequested information which is or may be 
exculpatory. Again, in State v. Kail in, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 
1994), that Court reaffirmed the State's duty "under the Due 
Process of Clause of the United States Constitution to provide, 
without request by the defendant, all exculpatory evidence." 
Worthen, at 850; State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 
1985) .) 
(2) The duty to provide inculpatory evidence, when 
required by court order, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. In Kail in, the Court noted the practice in 
this state in some districts for prosecutors to make all 
inculpatory evidence available to the defense on request, and in 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987), the Court 
13 
emphasized that it is a prosecutor's duty to comply fully and 
forthrightly with such a request. Knight also established the 
principle that when the prosecution makes a voluntary disclosure 
of inculpatory evidence to a defendant, it must produce all the 
requested material or identify those portions not disclosed. 
In the instant case, the Tooele County prosecutor's 
office maintained an "open-file" policy; that is, discovery was 
provided to the defense even though no formal discovery request 
was made. Under that policy, the prosecutor's duty to furnish 
the confidential informant audiotape to the defense was absolute: 
if the tape were exculpatory, it had to be produced under the 
first Kail in requirement; if it were inculpatory, it had to be 
produced under the prosecution's duty to make a correct and 
complete disclosure, or it had to be identified as a portion of 
evidence not disclosed. Knight at 916. The prosecutor's 
voluntarily-produced Response to Motion for Discovery created an 
"unconditional agreement to produce statements" in the possession 
of any group or aency involved in the investigation or 
prosecution of the case. He was therefore obliged to "search 
beyond his own file cabinet" to determine whether there were 
additional materials that should be provided to the defense. 
Knight at 918. 
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To simply state, as did the prosecutor in the instant 
case, "Recorded . . . evidence in aural . . . form, which has not 
been transcribed at the time of this response [,] may be viewed at 
the office of the prosecutor . . ." was not adequate to identify 
the audiotape of the confidential informant as either an item 
being produced or an item being withheld. If the prosecution 
argues that the tape was too garbled to be intelligible, it still 
should have been furnished to the defendant for his use in 
determining whether the quality of the recording could be 
enhanced. 
B. The prosecutor's failure to produce the audiotape or 
transcript negatively impacted the defense. 
The failure of the State to provide this evidence 
impaired the Defendant's ability to defend himself. Courts have 
generally refused to conclude that evidence is overwhelming in 
cases that ultimately rest on a jury's resolution of conflicting 
evidence, and have held that prosecutorial error (such as 
improper "Doyle" statements in closing argument) are not harmless 
where a trial come down to a "credibility judgment." State v. 
Byrd, 937 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), quoting White v. 
State, 647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) and Aesoph v. 
State, 102 Nev. 316, 721 P.2d 379, 383 (Nev. 1986) . 
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In this case there were three primary witnesses: a 
police officer, the confidential informant, and the actual seller 
of the drugs to the confidential informant. The police officer 
listened to the proceedings via a receiving device in his 
vehicle, which picked up the transmission from the "wire" 
emplaced upon the body of the confidential informant. The 
officer (Officer Roger Niesporek) testified that he could hear 
the following: 
Q And did you then hear the C.I., Mr. Girmaud, say 
something? 
A Yes. He asked Butch if he had a teener. 
Q And did you hear a response to that request? 
A Yes I did. 
Q And did you recognize the voice of the person who 
responded? 
A Yes I could. 
Q And what did you hear? 
A He said, UI wish I did." 
Q And could you tell who said that? 
A That was Butch Begonia (sic). 
Q And then what happened? 
16 
A Then Butch turned to someone else and asked if he had 
any, and this person said, "Yes, I do." 
(P. 65, R. 132). Officer Niesporek testified that he heard the 
conversation, but that he didn't make any notes concerning it 
until he wrote his report after returning to the station. 
A secondary witness, Officer Steve Swartzfager, 
testified that he had bits and pieces, that didn't "fit into 
place" (p. 77, R. 144), because the transmission was breaking 
up at his location. 
The second primary prosecution witness was the 
confidential informant, who identified himself for the record as 
"Joseph Riley Girmaud" but who, according to the court's 
transcriptionist, spelled his name, "G-R-I-M-A-U-D." (We will 
use his name as he spelled it, "Grimaud.") Grimaud testified: 
A Then he came over to me and I asked him again if he had 
anything and he said, "No, but someone probably does." 
Q What did he ask Jack? 
A He asked Jack if he had any, and he said, "Yeah, I do." 
Q And then Jack pulled it out? 
A Yes. 
Q And then what did you do? 
17 
I handed him the $100.00 and Butch slid the bag that I 
see in front of me, over to me. 
From Jack? 
Yes. 
-6, R. 172-3). 
And he slid it over to you and you gave Jack the money? 
I just set it on the desk. 
, R. 173). 
Under cross examination, Mr. Grimaud further testified: 
I thought you just told me that when you went to buy, 
Jack pulled out the baggy and put it on the table. Is 
that correct? 
No sir. 
Okay, then what did he do? 
Jack Henwood had a plastic bag; a clear plastic baggy 
with him. He took it out. He pulled open his desk 
drawer there at Butch7s shop, and pulled out this 
yellow baggy, dumped it in there, set in on the table. 
That's when I put down my $100.00. 
So Jack went and took a baggy from Butch's desk drawer? 
No, Butch grabbed the baggy for Jack and put it in. 
You just said just a second ago that he opened the 
drawer, and he grabbed the baggy out of the drawer. 
That is what you just said. 
We was all sitting around the table. Butch grabbed 
open his drawer, handed him the yellow baggy to Jack 
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Henwood, Jack Henwood then toad (sic) some of his bag, 
put in that bag. Because he had more than a teener on 
him. 
(P. 109, R. 176). 
The testimony of the confidential informant was a 
surprise to both the prosecution and the defense. After a 
counsel in the judge's chambers, the actual seller of the drugs 
to the confidential informant (Jack Henwood) was called by the 
defense to contradict Mr. Grimaud's testimony, although he had 
not previously been identified as a defense witness. The State 
objected to Mr. Henwood as a witness, particularly since 
Mr. Grimaud had been released by both participants, but the 
defense argued that it needed Mr. Henwood to rebut Mr. Grimaud's 
surprise testimony. After commenting that the testimony probably 
should not have been a surprise, the Court allowed Mr. Henwood to 
testify, and, in addition, allowed the State a continuance of the 
trial in order to contact and recall Mr. Grimaud in rebuttal to 
Mr. Henwood. 
Mr. Henwood testified: 
Q Did you see Joe approach Butch? 
A Yes I did. 
Q Do you remember what he said? 
A He asked Butch if he had a teener. 
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Q And what did Butch say? 
A He said "No." I don't think (inaudible) said anything. 
He looked over at me and I said, "I've got one." 
Q Okay, and where was everyone standing at this time? 
A I think Butch was by his desk, Joe was sitting on a 
chair by some parts bins, and I was standing in the 
middle of the shop. 
Q Okay, when you said that you had some, what did you do? 
A I think Joe - he asked for a teener. I pulled it out 
and went over and threw it over on the desk I think, if 
I remember right, and said it was a bill. he asked how 
much and I said, "A bill." 
Q Okay, and what was Butch doing at this time? 
A Sitting at his desk. He just kind of looked at me. 
Q Okay, did he touch this envelope? 
A The plastic bag? 
Q The plastic bag - the baggy? 
A I threw it on the desk. 
Q At any time did you see Butch pull open the desk 
drawer? 
A No, I don't think so. 
Q When you gave the baggy to Joe, was - did you already 
have it in a little baggy, or did you pour some? 
A Yes. I already had the baggy. 
Q So he didn't pour any into any? 
A I don't think so. I don't remember. 
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Q Okay. And just so I understand. What was the 
conversation again when Joe came up to Butch and said, 
uDo you have a teener?" What did Butch say? 
A He said, "No." He said, "I wished I did," or something 
like that. He said, UI wish I did. 
Q And then what did Butch say? 
A I don't think he said anything. I think he looked over 
at me and I said, "I've got one." I'm not sure if he 
asked me or - I don't think he did. I think he looked 
over because I was waiting to see if I could sell him 
some, when I got there. I think he was busy and I 
didn't know this guy that asked. 
Q So to your knowledge, did Butch ever touch the baggy or 
the one-hundred dollar bill? 
A I don't think so. I know I threw - I knew I threw the 
baggy on the desk. I remember that, because I had like 
three of them - three or four of them and I went 
through and I tossed it down on the desk. 
Q When you were later - when you were arrested, what 
drugs did you have on you at that time? 
A I had, I think, two teeners and two 1/4 grams - two. 
Q Okay, did you have any loose baggies on you? 
A Yes. I had a lot of loose baggies. 
(P. 132., R. 199) . 
Officer Niesporek was called for recross examination, 
and testified: 
Q He stated that he had told you before that all there 
parties were sitting around the table, and he told you 
that. Do you remember him saying that to you? 
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A We had a brief conversation at the City Shops when he 
gave me the (inaudible); . . . I don't specifically 
recall him saying that Butch had handed it to him on 
that transaction. 
Q Okay, because if he did tell you that you probably 
would have written it down in your report? 
A I believe I would have. 
Q And this information is not in your police report, 
correct? 
A It is not. 
Q So any information about Butch, and him getting baggies 
out of a drawer, or handing the baggies to Jack, or 
pushing the bag of methamphetamine over to Mr. Girmaud, 
you never heard that before? 
A I don't recall that, no. 
Q And it*'s not in your police report. 
A No it's not. 
(P. 145, R. 212-213). 
Officer Niesporek also testified that Mr. Henwood told 
him that he had poured the stuff into a baggy before he ever 
reached Butch's shop. (P. 145, R. 214). 
Mr. Henwood's testimony matched Officer Niesporek's 
quite closely, pertaining to Mr. Borgogno's words and the 
handling of the baggy given to Mr. Grimaud. The tape would have 
verified these words. It is possible that the noise of a drawer 
being opened would also carry on the tape, but Mr. Henwood 
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testified that he did not open a desk drawer, and Officer 
Niesporek did not mention hearing such a sound. 
In the very recent case of State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), a police officer testified that he saw, 
via long-distance surveillance, the passenger in the front seat 
of a vehicle appear to have accepted an item resembling drugs and 
to have handed money to the seller. The officer also testified 
that he could not see the driver or the backseat passenger. The 
defendant admitted that he was the frontseat passenger, but 
denied that he had accepted drugs or passed money to the seller. 
He testified that the driver and backseat passenger bought the 
drugs. Neither the State nor the defendant offered corroborating 
evidence to support either version of these events, and thus the 
case came down to a "one-on-one situation, i.e., the word of the 
defendant against the word of the key prosecution witness." 
Similarly, no corroborating evidence was offered in the 
instant case, other than the fact that Mr. Henwood was arrested 
while in possession of three yellow baggies containing an illegal 
substance, and several loose baggies. Thus, the jury had to 
resolve several points of conflicting testimony in order to find 
the defendant guilty. The Byrd court held that the prosecutor's 
constitutional error (comments to the jury that were held to be 
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prejudicial) was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 
Here, there is a very strong likelihood that the tape 
not physically produced by the prosecution would have 
corroborated the police officer's statements, and thus Mr. 
Henwood's statements, so that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Consistent with the arguments made above, 
together with the analysis in State v. Knight and State v. 
Byrd, this Court should find that the prosecutor committed plain 
error in not producing the tape and/or transcript, which was 
prejudicial and harmful to the defendant's ability to defend 
himself. 
POINT II 
FAILURE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO MAKE A FORMAL DISCOVERY 
REQUEST, AND TO FOLLOW UP WITH A MOTION TO COMPEL THE 
PRODUCTION OF THE TAPE AND/OR TRANSCRIPT, CONSTITUTES 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Although being raised for the first time on appeal, 
this issue is properly before this Court because: (1) the record 
below is adequate, there being a transcript of the trial and a 
record of all pre-trial proceedings, and (2) the defendant is no 
longer represented by trial counsel. State v. Humphries, 818 
P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991); State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1993); State v. Cosey, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991). Having 
met these preconditions, the defendant/appellant is entitled to 
review of his claims concerning the ineffective assistance of his 
trial counsel. 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that his or her counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and 
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
counsel, the result would have been different. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 
913 (Utah 1988)). A reasonable probability is defined as ua 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2068 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). The appellate 
courts of Utah have reaffirmed their commitment to these 
standards for effective assistance of counsel in State v. 
Crestani, 711 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Verde, 
op. cit., reh'g denied; State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Humphries, op. cit. 
Further, in order to prevail in a claim that trial 
counsel demonstrated a deficient performance, defendant must 
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's actions were 
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conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for his counsel's actions. In the 
instant case, trial counsel had an obligation to prepare fully 
for trial, which makes it incumbent upon him to read the police 
reports provided to him by the prosecution. The report of 
Officer Roger Niesporek (included herewith as Appendix XXA" and 
incorporated herein by this reference) described the "wiring" of 
the confidential informant, his listening to the transmission 
from the wire from inside his police vehicle, and after returning 
to the police station, turning in the tape uto Pat Martin for 
transcription." It is inconceivable that trial counsel could 
have read this report without being made aware of the existence 
of the tape and, presumably, a transcription thereof. 
The transcript of the trial is even more convincing 
that there was not a conscious strategy with regard to the tape. 
Therein, a record is made of the defendant/appellant himself 
asking the court, during a recess in chambers: 
Mr. Borgogno: "Your Honor, I've got just one question. 
Do I have the right to listen to the tape where I supposedly 
The Court: You should talk that over with your 
attorney(,) Mr. Borgogno, not with me, okay? 
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(P. 103, R. 170). It is clear from this exchange that the 
defendant himself was certain that the tape, the existence of 
which was attested by both Officer Niesporek and Mr. Grimaud, 
could not show anything other than what he knew to have been 
actually spoken on the night of the drug buy. Still, the record 
of the court's proceedings is silent concerning any motion, 
whether pretrial or in limine, for production of the tape or for 
continuance of the trial to allow production of the tape. 
Later, trial counsel asked Mr. Grimaud about the tape: 
Q Did you write any records down? 
A No sir. 
Q Okay. And your conversation was taped, is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And as far as your knowledge goes, who has the 
tape of this conversation? 
A I have no idea. 
Q Okay. . . . 
(P. 107-8, R. 174-5). Here, counsel makes it clear that he is 
aware of the tape. It did not matter whether the contents of the 
tape were exculpatory or inculpatory. The prosecution had a duty 
to make a correct and complete disclosure of evidence, including 
this tape, but defense counsel also had an affirmative duty to 
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make a reasonable investigation. Kallin, at 143. The above-
cited question to Mr. Grimaud is the only reference in the entire 
record to any investigation of the tape by defense counsel. In 
its context, it does not present any idea that counsel had a 
trial strategy that precluded the use of the tape. By making the 
jury again aware of the tape, but failing to point out that the 
prosecution had not submitted the tape for them (or him) to hear, 
there does not appear to be any point at all in his question to 
Mr. Grimaud. 
The second prong of the Strickland test, that there 
must be reasonable probability that counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial, is met in the 
same manner as set forth in Point I above. The witnesses 
conflicted in their testimony, so that the jury was left to 
determine between the greater credibility of two persons. The 
prosecutor's closing argument virtually ignored the testimony of 
Officer Niesporek, which tended to lend credence to the 
statements of the defense witness. Had the tape been introduced 
to provide an incontrovertible testimony, the jury would have 
been placed in the position of making a decision based upon 
evidence, rather than personality. The probability is more than 
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reasonable, therefore, that the verdict would have been 
different. 
Since defendant/appellant had a constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel, and did not receive that 
benefit, the verdict should be overturned. 
POINT III 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO LISTEN TO THE TAPE 
RECORDING, OR ACQUIRE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE TAPE AND/OR A 
COPY OF THE RECORDING ITSELF, CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Again, as stated in Point II above, although being 
raised for the first time on appeal this issue is properly before 
this Court because: (1) the record below is adequate, there 
being a transcript of the trial and a record of all pre-trial 
proceedings, and (2) the defendant is no longer represented by 
trial counsel. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Cosey, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991). Having met these 
preconditions, the defendant/appellant is entitled to review of 
his claims concerning the ineffective assistance of his trial 
counsel. 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that his or her counsel 
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rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and 
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
counsel, the result would have been different. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 
913 (Utah 1988)). A reasonable probability is defined as "a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2068 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). The appellate 
courts of Utah have reaffirmed their commitment to these 
standards for effective assistance of counsel in State v. 
Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Verde, 
op. cit., reh'g denied; State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Humphries, op. cit. 
Further, in order to prevail in a claim that trial 
counsel demonstrated a deficient performance, defendant must 
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's actions were 
conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for his counsel's actions. 
Defense counsel was given a copy of Officer Niesporek's 
report about his contact with, and wiring of, Mr. Grimaud. He 
knew that a tape was made from the wire transmission. He 
received notice from the prosecutor that: 
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3. Unless exculpatory evidence or evidence which 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt 
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment(,) is set forth in the attached 
documents, the same is unknown to the prosecutor, and the 
prosecutor herewith denies the request for production of the 
same. 
(R. 6-7). Since the prosecutor also was in possession of the 
police report, defense counsel should have gone through the 
natural thought process: "They have a tape of the conversation 
between the C.I. and the defendant. They haven't produced it. 
The prosecutor says he has provided all exculpatory or mitigating 
evidence that he knows about. Therefore the tape must be 
damning, they'll use it at trial, and I better get a copy of it 
to see how bad it is and how to handle the damage." However, 
even though the Response to Motion for Discovery was dated more 
than three months after the date on which Officer Niesporek 
turned in the tape for transcription, the prosecutor had also 
given notice that: 
5. Recorded reports or evidence in aural or visual 
form, which has not been transcribed at the time of this 
response [,] may be viewed at the office of the prosecutor or 
such other place as he may designate upon an appointment 
being arranged between the prosecutor and the defendant's 
counsel. 
(R. 6-7). This statement presented the possibility that the 
tape was not inculpatory, but was instead exculpatory, and opened 
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up the further possibility that the prosecutor was attempting to 
avoid the burden of providing exculpatory evidence by not 
acquiring a transcription, and thereby placing the burden upon 
the defense to listen to the tape. With no evidence to present 
in his client's behalf, relying only upon his client's 
protestations of innocence and a belief that the testimony of the 
confidential informant would at best prove ambiguous as to 
whether his client had "arranged" a sale of illegal substances, 
defense counsel owed his client the duty of investigating every 
possibility: he should have gone in and listened to the tape; he 
should have requested a copy of the tape; he should have acquired 
a transcript of the tape. That he did none of these points to a 
failure on his part to give the effective assistance to which his 
client was entitled. 
As in Point II, the second prong of the Strickland 
test, that there must be reasonable probability that counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial, is met 
in the same manner as set forth in Point I above. The witnesses 
conflicted in their testimony, so that the jury was left to 
determine between the greater credibility of two persons. The 
prosecutor's closing argument virtually ignored the testimony of 
Officer Niesporek, which lent credence to the statements of the 
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defense witness. Had the tape been introduced to provide 
testimony that was not subject to the fallible memory of the 
participants, the jury would have been placed in the position of 
making a decision based upon evidence, rather than presentation 
and appearance. The probability is more than reasonable, 
therefore, that their verdict would have been different. 
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that 
counsel's failure to listen to the tape, or read a transcript of 
it, was a conscious decision and part of his trial strategy. We 
have already cited the trial transcript wherein the defendant 
asked the trial court if he could have the opportunity of 
listening to the tape. The manner of his question ("Your Honor, 
I've got just one question. Do I have the right to listen to the 
tape where I supposedly --") makes it clear that his only 
knowledge of the contents of the tape was derived as a 
participant in the events; he knew what the tape should say 
because he was present when it was made; his counsel had not told 
him what the tape contained and his counsel had not discussed 
with him any existing reasons for not using the tape himself. 
Indeed, counsel's immediately subsequent question to Mr. Grimaud 
("And as far as your knowledge goes, who has the tape of this 
conversation?") raises the speculation that counsel was just 
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beginning to realize that the tape could be important to his 
client's interests. No tactical basis appears evident. 
Since defendant/appellant had a constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel, and did not receive that 
benefit, the verdict should be overturned. 
POINT IV 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST VOIR DIRE 
REGARDING PRETRIAL PUBLICITY SURROUNDING DRUG ACTIVITY 
IN STOCKTON, UTAH, AND ALLEGING THE DEFENDANT'S LINKS 
THERETO, IMPEDED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
AND CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
As set forth in Points II and III above, although being 
raised for the first time on appeal, this issue is properly 
before this Court because: (1) the record below is adequate, 
there being a transcript of the trial and a record of all pre-
trial proceedings, and (2) the defendant is no longer represented 
by trial counsel. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 
1991); State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1993); State 
v. Cosey, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991). Having met these 
preconditions, the defendant/appellant is entitled to review of 
his claims concerning the ineffective assistance of his trial 
counsel. 
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A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that his or her counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and 
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
counsel, the result would have been different. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 
913 (Utah 1988)). A reasonable probability is defined as "a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2068 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). The appellate 
courts of Utah have reaffirmed their commitment to these 
standards for effective assistance of counsel in State v. 
Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Verde, 
op. cit., reh'g denied-, State v. Garrett, 849 P. 2d 578 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Humphries, op. cit. 
Further, in order to prevail in a claim that trial 
counsel demonstrated a deficient performance, defendant must 
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's actions were 
conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any 
conceivable tactical basis for his counsel's actions. 
In May of 1990, Tooele County Sheriff's officers were 
dispatched to an explosion and fire at "the old church" in 
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Stockton, Utah. The building was owned by the defendant herein, 
Gasper Borgogno. The building's tenant escaped, but chemicals 
were found in the building that were considered a hazard to the 
community, and the town was evacuated while a HazMat team cleaned 
up the site and disposed of the materials. (See incident reports 
attached hereto as Appendix UB" and incorporated herein by this 
reference.) Stockton is a small town, with a population of 
approximately 50 0, and news of the "drug lab" that was reported 
to have been operated in the building's basement was a major 
topic of discussion in town. Newspaper articles on the incident 
and evacuation were carried in the Tooele Transcript, a twice-
weekly newspaper in general circulation in Tooele County, and in 
the Salt Lake City daily newspapers. Mr. Borgogno's name was 
linked with the incident, as the building's owner, and he was 
associated with the lab by implication. 
The extensive publicity and attendant notoriety have 
made Mr. Borgogno's name known to a large proportion, if not all, 
of the residents of Tooele County--the same residents making up 
the pool of prospective jury members at the time of the trial in 
the instant case. Yet the only voir dire asked were the 
questions, uDo any of you know the defendant . . . ?" (R. 80), 
u
 (A) re you related to any of the parties by blood or marriage?" 
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(R. 18), and "Do any of you bear any special relationship to the 
parties, . . . ?" (R. 82). The record shows that defense 
counsel asked that the veniremen be asked about their employment. 
In light of the pervasiveness of the news reports and 
the defendant's subsequent involvements with law-enforcement 
personnel in the Tooele area, it does not appear to appellate 
counsel that Mr. Borgogno's interests were properly served by his 
counsel's failure to ask for more extensive voir dire. It is 
possible that even a change of venue could have been properly 
requested, given the circumstances. 
This Court has held, in State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), that a trial court is afforded broad 
discretion during voir dire, and that this discretion "must be 
exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice 
in prospective jurors." In Vigil, this Court affirmed that 
reversible error may occur when a conclusion can be drawn, after 
reviewing the totality of the questioning, that trial counsel did 
not receive an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate jurors. However, the purposes behind voir 
dire (to allow trial counsel to discover any biases an individual 
juror may have which would support a challenge for cause, and an 
opportunity for trial counsel to gather sufficient information to 
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be able to intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge) cannot 
be accomplished if counsel himself fails to request that the 
court ask the proper questions. In the instant case, the trial 
judge was not a resident of Tooele County and was not familiar 
with its immediate local history. It was therefore incumbent 
upon defense counsel to move for the inclusion of questions that 
would probe the mindset of the prospective jurors. 
The recent case of Durham v. Duchesne County, 893 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1995), presented a similar example of a situation 
wherein the jury pool came from a sparsely populated, rural 
county, with individuals who could be particularly concerned with 
the assets of their county. In the instant case, the jury pool 
came from a sparsely populated, tightly knit, rural county, with 
individuals who could be particularly concerned with the safety 
of their county. The Durham case was reversed and remanded after 
the trial court denied a motion for change of venue and the jury 
found no cause of action existed in the case. 
In State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), this court found that careful voir dire conducted by the 
judge, followed by defense counsel's passing the jury for cause, 
was sufficient caution to ensure that the defendant received a 
fair trial. 
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Contrary to the two actions just cited, in the instant 
case the record demonstrates that defense counsel failed to 
suggest any voir dire concerning pretrial publicity, despite his 
client's suggestion that such questioning would be appropriate. 
Thus, the defendant's right to rebut any question of bias was 
denied him, by the actions of his counsel. Since only cursory 
questions were posed, the defendant has no way of knowing how he 
might have been prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to 
provide this form of effective assistance. However, plain error 
analysis is used in determining whether a trial court's voir dire 
was adequate to rebut any question of bias in prospective jurors 
(State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and a 
reading of the record makes it clear that there were no efforts 
to ascertain the amount and type of knowledge those prospective 
jurors had concerning the defendant and his name. The only 
question directly related to him personally was, "Do you know the 
defendant?" One may not "know" a person, yet still be aware of 
his reputation in a small community. "Knowing" does not equate 
to general familiarity with the gossip concerning one's neighbor, 
and a question about "knowing" a person is not likely to elicit a 
response illustrative of the defendant's fame, or infamy, in a 
localized area. 
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In the 1994 case of Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1994) , Parsons argued that his counsel failed to conduct 
adequate voir dire by not asking the jurors what they had heard 
or read about his case. Thus, counsel created no record from 
which an appellate court could determine whether juror exposure 
to the media resulted in prejudice. In the incident case, 
counsel did not even ask the jurors whether they had heard about 
the case. 
In the instant case, given the familiarity of the jury 
pool members with the persons involved in the case, there is 
reasonable probability that one or more jurors would have been 
excused from service upon this jury had more extensive probing 
taken place. Had even one person pointed out to the other jurors 
that Officer Niesporek's testimony corroborated that of the 
defense witness, the jury's verdict could well have been 
different. However, defendant was not given the opportunity to 
explore this avenue because of his counsel's failure to ask. At 
the very least, in this situation one's "confidence is 
undermined" in the verdict. 
40 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court should 
reverse the verdict of the jury and remand the case to the Third 
District Court with directions to dismiss the charge. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of March, 1998. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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uk.&£ 
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APPENDIX A 
POLICE REPORT PREPARED BY OFFICER 
ROGER NIESPOREK, 5/28/96 
CONF I DENT IAL INFORMANT 
3 23 N MAIN 
iOOELE. UF, 
'"AY CR'MJSE 
2b6 S ST!! v.T 
TOOELE. UT. 332-DM 05 
UP ITER: ROGER NIESPORER 
DATE: M&v 29. 1996 
963361 
OH 5-23-96 I MET WITH THE ABOVE LISTED OFFICERS AT THE TOOELE 
PITY POLICE DEPARTMENT TO CONDUCT A CONTROLLED BUY OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. I HAD BEEN ADVISED BY MY CONFIDENTIAL INFORHANT (C.l.) 
I HAT HE HAD BOUGHT <>?ANH. CMETHAMPHFTAMINE) FROM BUTCH BORCOCNO IN 
r;:E PAST AND THAI HE BELIEVED HE COULD BUY SOME TODAY. I HAD 
CONTACTED TOOELE COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH 
OET. TOHBOO .ON THIS CASE DUE TO BORCOGNO LIVING IN STOC:-:TCN. SEE 
COUNTY CASE NUMBEF ?613'.-1. CN THIS DATE THE C.I. MET WITH US -7 
7 HE P OL ICE DEPARTMENT. HI'. MOTOR_R.VF > F L'AS ^.FAF.CXEP BY OFFICER 
NICSPOREH. HIS PERSON V.'A." SEARCHED T'-. OET. S'JARTZFACBH . AND MY 
S E L F . A WIRE WAS THEN PLACED ON THE •_' . I . AND HE L.'\: GIVEN A ONE 
HUNDRED COLLAR SELL TO BUY THE rc-NTFOLLED SUBSTANCE. PET 
yAF.'TZFAGER. AND DET. TOMBOCK WERE IN ONE CAR. AND OFFICER 
MISSPOKE}:. AND MY SELF WERE IN THE OTHER -""AR. EOTH VEHICLES 
COULD RECEIVE THE T RAN i - F i 4 « i L FROM THE C.l. WIRE. WZ THEN WENT TO 
STOCKTON. DET. S.yAPT: FACER. AND TGME'OCK. PARKED BY STOCKTON PASS. 
OFFICER NIE SPORE!- *NL- I !-OL LOVED THE C . I . INTO STOCKTON. .-.:• y<Z 
f 'UlLFD INT'" THE P.--RHING Af.EA OF BOTCHES GAl-AOE KF -All.- ft: JOHNN" . 
0 0 2 2 G ! 
tJOKK E'0RC.!'t0NO> *.T THAT TIME I FURNED ON' THE T -.PE_ RE'C-rDER 0?,' 
THE RECEIVER. ( T THEN PARKED BV THE FIRS c. FATTON IN 
'."OULD TELL THAT THE RECEIVER WAS MO F PICKING. UP THE TRAM: IT Vi-^r. 
1 THEM TURNED OM HV POCKET TAPE RECORDER TO TAPE THE CONVERSATION 
OVER MY CAR RADIO. THE C.I. HAD MADE CONTACT VITH BUTCH. HE 
ADVISED THAT HE WOULD BE WITH HIM IN A MINUET. THEY CONTINUED TO 
TALK ABOUT CARS. DURIMC THE CONVERSATION I.COULD TELL THAT THERE 
WAS_THREE,,TO.FOUR-PEOPLE-.TALKIMG. THE. WIRE THEM STARTED TO CUT 
9fe33bi 
HAD -::-Zl- .\ .'iWE KUMC-!Vi:r« HOtLAR E 
AiJ-TL? IF I COULD BUY THAT PTU . 
GILL 7 MA I THE C. T . L>? F P TO BUY 
THE CAS-.cTTE TAPE WAS GIVEN TO 
OF REPORT. 
L L . .-tit < ' . L ' V I : , : L ' • n.-. i r.r n.-\.;. 1 
SHE SAFD.VSS. THIS GILL VAS THE 
THE TEE NET; OF CR'ANK FROM HE.WOOD. 
PAT MARTIN TO BE TRANSCRIBED, END 
APPENDIX B 
TOOELE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
INCIDENT REPORT, 05/04/90 
Supplemental Report: OFFENSE Incident: 1 90001225 
Rpt Date Time Offer Subject 
01 / / 
DET SGT ALAN JAMES - 05/04/90 - OFFICER DISPATCHED TO A REPORTED 
EXPLOSION AT THE OLD CHURCH IN STOCKTON CITY AT APPROX. 11:57HRS 
OFFICER ARRIVED AT APPROX. 00:15 HRS. AND AT THAT TIME HE 
OBSERVED THAT THE RED BRICK BUILDING ON THE NORTH-WEST CORNER OF 
THE INTERSECTION OF SILVER AVENUE AND JOHNSON STREET, KNOWN AS 
THE OLD CHURCH HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN 
EXPLOSION. THE PLYWOOD COVERINGS ON THE WINDOWS WERE TORN AWAY 
FROM THE BUILDING, THERE WAS SMOKE COMMING FROM THE BASEMENT OF 
OF THE BUILDING, AND THE ODOR OF CHEMICALS IN THE AIR THAT 
SEEMED TO BE EMINATING FROM THE BUILDING. ON THE NORTH SIDE OF 
THE BUILDING I OBSERVED DEPUTY ERICKSON TALKING WITH A MALE 
SUBJECT. I APPROACHED THE TWO AND OBSERVED THE MALE SUBJECT, HE 
APPEARED TO BE INJURED AND I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD BEEN INJURED HE 
STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INSIDE THE BUILDING WHEN THE EXPLOSION 
OCCURRED AND HAD A SLIGHT BURN TO THE LEFT SIDE OF HIS FACE, I 
ASKED HIM IF HE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION AND HE STATED NO, BUT 
HE DID NEED TO GO BACK INTO THE BUILDING AND MAKE SURE EVERYTHIN 
WAS SAFE. HE ENTERED THE BUILDING WITH DEPUTY ERICKSON AND THEN 
RETURNED IN A FEW MINUTES AND INSTRUCTED ME TO TURN THE P2WER 
OFF TO THE BUILDING, WHICH I DID. I THEN ASKED THE SUBJECT WHO 
HE WAS AND HE STATED THAT HIS NAME WAS DAVID BERNHARD, I ASKED 
HIM WHAT TYPE OF CHEMICALS HE HAD IN THE EASEMENT OF THE BUILDIN 
AND HE STATE THAT THERE WERE SOME DANGEROUS ONES, AND THEN GAVE 
ME SOME NAMES THAT I DID NOT UNDERSTAND. AT THAT TIME I ASKED 
THE SUBJECT IF IT WAS A LAB AND HE STATED THAT IT WAS BUT WOULD 
NOT SAY WHAT KIND. I THEN HANDED THE SUBJECT OVER TO SGT 
MORGAN TO TRANSPORT TO THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE SO HE COULD CLEAN UP 
THE SUBJECT WAS TAKEN TO THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE. I ALSO OBSERVED 
A 1971 FORD VAN UTAH LISTING 8043CA PARKED EAST OF THE BUILDING 
ALAN JAMES 
05/04/9 0 - SGT JOE BRADSHAW -
ON THIS DATE I RECEIVED A CALL TO THE S.O. TO ASSIST WITH THE 
QUESTIONING OF A SUBJECT WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SOME TYPE OF A 
EXPLOSION AT THE OLD CHURCH IN STOCKTON. I MET WITH SGT TOM 
MORGAN WHO HAD BROUGHT THE SUBJECT TO THE S.O. SUBJECTS NAME IS 
DAVID D. BERNHARD OF SALT LAKE CITY, DOB 022065. AFTER SUBJECT 
HAD CLEANED UP SOME WHAT HE WAS TAKEN TO THE DETECTIVE OFFICE 
WHERE A TAPPED INTERVIEW WITH THE SUBJECT WAS CONDUCTED BY SGT 
BRADSHAW AND MORGAN. DURING THE INTERVIEW THE SUBJECT TOLD ME 
THAT HE HAD BEEN WORKING ON A FUSION PROJECT OF HIS OWN AND THAT 
THE CHEMICALS THAT WERE IN THE BUILDING WERE ONLY FOR THIS TYPE 
OF PROJECT. HE STATED THAT HE HAD GOTTEN THEM TO HOT AND IT HAD 
CAUSED AN EXPLOSION. WHEN I ASKED SUBJECT IF HE HAD BEEN COOKING 
DRUGS HE STATED NO. SUBJECT WAS ASKED IF HE KNEW WHO OWNED THE 
BUILDING AND HE STATED YES, BUTCH BORGONO OF STOCKTON. SUBJECT 
SAID THAT HE WAS RENTING OR LEASEING THE BUILDING, OR SOMETHING 
LIKE THAT. WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD SIGNED ANY PAPERS AS TO THE RENT 
HE SAID NO, HE PAID $200.00 CASH PER MONTH. I ASKED SUBJECT IF 
Supplemental Report: OFFENSE Incident: 1 90001235 
THERE WAS ANY ETHER AT THE SIT AND HE SAID THERE PROBABLY WAS. 
WHEN ASKED WHAT OTHER CHEMICALS WERE THERE HE SAID HE DIDN'T 
WANT TO GO INTO ALL THAT. SUBJECT WAS ASKED FOR A CONSENT TO 
SEARCH WHICH HE REFUSED, BUT DID SIGN A WAIVER OF MARANDA RIGHTS 
SUBJECT WAS ALSO GIVEN HIS MARANDA RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE INTERVIEW 
AT THIS TIME A RAP SHEET WAS RUN ON SUBJECT AND IT WAS FOUND 
THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT, 
DRUG POSSESSION AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHENRNALIA IN THE PAST AND 
AT THIS TIME THE CHEMICALS POSE A THREAT TO THE COMMUNITY. AFTER 
THE INTERVIEW THE SUBJECT WAS ALLOWED TO GO INTO THE HALL AND 
MAKE A PHONE CALL. SHORTLY THERE AFTER SUBJECT DISAPPEARED. NC 
ONE HAS SEEN SUBJECT SINCE. ALONG WITH THE REQUEST FOR A SEARCH 
VJARRANT ON THE BUILDING OWNED BY BORGONO AND OCCUPIED BY SUBJECT 
BERNHARD I REQUEST SEARCH WARRANT TO INCLUDE SEARCH ON GREEN 
1971 FORD VAN, UTAH LICENCE # 8048CA, REGISTERED TO SUSPECT 
BERNHARD 
ASSIGNED TO: 
REVIEWING SUPERVISOR 
DATE: TIME: 
DATE : 
